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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS POLITICAL LAW 
MARK TUSHNET* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses some of the critical reviews of The People 
Themselves, focusing on how they respond to the proposition, which I be-
lieve to be correct and made in The People Themselves, that constitutional 
law is a distinctive or special kind of law. I call that kind of law political 
law. 1 Both parts of the formulation are equally important. Constitutional 
law is law, what is sometimes described as "hard" law.2 As law, it some-
times induces decision-makers to make decisions that are inconsistent with 
their "pure" preferences, that is, those they would hold in the absence of 
law. My aim is primarily to clarify some methodological issues connected 
to the idea of constitutional law as political law, rather than to make a sub-
stantive contribution to the analysis. I observe at the outset, though, that I 
substantially agree with Kramer's contention that we can find in U.S. his-
tory a persistent strain of popular constitutionalism-that is, as I understand 
the point, the deployment of constitutional arguments by the people them-
selves, independent of, and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, con-
stitutional interpretations offered and enforced by the courts. After setting 
out some general methodological considerations, I briefly discuss the way 
in which popular constitutionalism is continuous with, albeit distinct from, 
more standard descriptions of constitutional law, as involving a dialogue 
between the courts and the people. I conclude with an examination of some 
consequentialist criticisms of popular constitutionalism, that is, the claim 
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
I. Kramer's term, drawn from John Phillip Reid, is "political-legal." See LARRY KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24, 63 (2004). Robert 
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism. Departmentalism. and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. 
REv. 1027, 1037-38 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism), articulate the 
distinction as one between constitutional law, a term they reserve for "the judgments and opinions of 
courts," and the Constitution, a term they say refers to "the fundamental beliefs of 'We the People. '" I 
believe that Kramer's terminology, and my own, is more illuminating because it does not attempt to 
draft conventional terminology into new service. 
2. See generally Symposium, 6 CON ST. COMMENT. 19 (1989) (addressing the question, Is the 
Constitution law?). See also Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note I, at 1034-37 (dis-
cussing "The Constitution as Law"), 1039 (asserting that "the Constitution has features of ordinary 
law"). 
991 
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that the people themselves have in fact done quite badly in interpreting the 
Constitution, as compared to the courts. Here I return to some methodo-
logical considerations, as the basis for arguing that the case for popular 
constitutionalism is stronger than its consequentialist critics suggest. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
That constitutional law is to some substantial degree law used to be 
entirely uncontroversial, and we therefore have a reasonably good sense of 
how to think about the "law" part of constitutional law. That constitutional 
law is to some substantial degree political is now largely uncontroversial,3 
but many efforts to analyze the "political" part of constitutional law strike 
me as simplistic, at least in that they treat constitutional law as only poli-
tics, and understand politics to be the expression of unanalyzable prefer-
ences.4 I take The People Themselves to be a sustained attempt to provide a 
rich body of historical information that provides the basis for thinking more 
deeply about the way in which constitutional law combines politics and 
law.5 
How-definitionally--can we distinguish between the legal and the 
political components of constitutional law? One of the points I make in this 
Article is that we cannot expect sharp analytic distinctions to be available 
when our interest is in the actual practice of constitutional law throughout 
u.s. history. Still, I can offer some suggestions to orient thinking, to get us 
in the general area where we ought to be. So, for example, as law, constitu-
tional law's primary characteristic is that it is to a large degree retrospec-
tive: Decision-makers today look to decisions made yesterday, whether 
evidenced by the Constitution's text or by judicial precedents, for guidance 
3. I note, though, that I take a central element in the criticisms of The People Themselves offered 
by Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 
(2005) (book review) [hereinafter Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism], to be the insistence, 
in my view mistaken, that constitutional law is only law, indistinguishable from common or statutory 
law. 
4. For a recent dramatic example, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court. 2004 Term-
Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31 (2005). 
5. I believe that European constitutional thought, influenced by Hans Kelsen, could be usefully 
consulted in understanding U.S. constitutional law. Kelsen designed the Austrian constitutional court, 
the major institutional alternative to the U.S. model for a court exercising the power of judicial review, 
as he did, precisely because he understood constitutional law to be a special kind of law, in which the 
political played a large role. He believed, I think mistakenly, that it followed from his understanding of 
constitutional law as political law that constitutional courts could act only as what he called negative 
legislators. For a discussion of Kelsen's constitutional theorizing, stressing the role of the constitutional 
court as a negative legislator, see Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 
HARV. INT'L L.J. 247, 256-57 (2001). I think it would be quite helpful, though I am not the person to do 
it, to develop a way of thinking about constitutional law as political law that would meld Kelsen's 
insights with the lessons of the U.S. experience with constitutional review. 
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and constraint. This retrospective character makes legal analysis an exer-
cise in interpretation--of texts, of practices, of history. In contrast, politics 
is to a large degree prospective: Decision-makers today make judgments 
about what would be best for the society going forward, without essential 
reference to prior events or practices. 
The inevitable fuzziness of the distinction between the legal and po-
litical components of constitutional law should be immediately apparent 
from these suggestions.6 For example, sensible decision-makers contem-
plating what would be best for society in the future will often, perhaps al-
ways, consult their understanding of what policies had worked well and 
poorly in the past, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly (as when 
they think of large analogies such as "Munich" in trying to figure out how 
to deal with dictators). Still, politics can involve decisions that are entirely 
forward-looking.? Additionally, sometimes retrospective examination-that 
is, interpreting the law as it is-involves assessing the consequences that 
we think would follow from finding the law to be X rather than Y. 
More interesting, and more directly related to Kramer's work, the 
people acting politically sometimes (though not always) engage in an inter-
pretive enterprise as well. Our political actions are sometimes efforts to 
understand who we are as a people, that is, who we have constituted our-
selves to be through our history. A dramatic recent example is the debate 
over the adoption of torture and closely related techniques of interrogation 
as a method to extract information about threats to national security. An 
important component of the arguments made by those proposing a statute 
to ban further use of such techniques was that their use was a betrayal of 
who we were as Americans.8 I take this argument to be one about constitu-
6. I note that an important element in some of the critical reviews of The People Themselves is a 
demand for more precision than is appropriate for the subject matter. See Alexander & Solum, Popular 
Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1602-07 (2005) (describing the authors' "conceptual toolkit"). 
Alexander and Solum's use of the phrase "cash out," id. at 1607, is a strong signal of their interest in 
greater conceptual precision than seems to me appropriate. See also id. at 1596 (describing popular 
constitutionalism "before the Constitution [as] something cloudy-diffuse, unclear, and ambiguous"), 
1618-19 ("[F]loating in a rarified atmosphere at the very highest level of abstraction, popular constitu-
tionalism is thin and wispy."); Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 405, 432 (2003) ("I am unclear precisely what it means."). I note that there is some tension 
between a description of Kramer's work as abstract and the obvious historical detail with which it is 
filled. 
7. Cf Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, (Dec. I, 1862), in 5 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518,537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) ("As our case is new, so we must 
think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country."). 
8. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senator John McCain, McCain Statement on Detainee Amend-
ments (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&ContenCid=1611 ("The enemy we fight has no respect for human life 
or human rights. They don't deserve our sympathy. But this isn't about who they are. This is about who 
we are. These are the values that distinguish us from our enemies."). 
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tionallaw in the context of prospective decision-making. Interpretation, the 
legal component of constitutional law as political law, is here inextricable 
from the forward-looking, political component of constitutional law as 
political law. 
As I have said, these comments are aimed simply at getting us in 
roughly the right area to think about constitutional law as political law. 
How can we engage in a closer examination of that idea? In my interpreta-
tion of his work, Kramer answers, By looking at history. People perform 
constitutional law as political law through (some ot) their mobilizations in 
politics. 
To begin with, we must examine some narrow points about using his-
tory to examine constitutional law as political law. Not all popular mobili-
zations are performances of constitutional law, although many, perhaps 
most, are. Kramer does not develop criteria for distinguishing between 
those that are and those that are not. Nor are crisp criteria likely to be avail-
able. My own sense is that Madison's metaphor about momentary confla-
grations that flare up in a single state but do not spread throughout the 
extended republic captures much of what is involved,9 but it would take 
detailed examination of particular incidents to begin to get a better sense of 
the distinction. I 0 
As Kramer properly emphasizes, popular mobilizations that are per-
formances of constitutional law are not necessarily unmediated by standard 
political organizations. I I In some eras, the people organize themselves "out 
of doors," in street demonstrations and the like, although even these mobi-
lizations always have some sort of organizational basis.12 Ordinarily, 
9. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) ("The influence of 
factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general 
conflagration through the other States."). 
10. L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. 
REv. 855, 866-84 (2005) (book review) [hereinafter Powe, Missing in Action], describes a number of 
candidates for popular mobilizations: massive resistance to desegregation, domestic anti-Communism 
and McCarthyism, Richard Nixon's law-and-order campaign, advocacy of restoring school prayer, anti-
busing agitation, anti-abortion protest, and anti-globalization. Of these, massive resistance, anti-busing, 
and anti-abortion protest pretty clearly count as popular mobilizations. The others are, in my view, more 
ambiguous. See also infra text accompanying note 14. 
II. But cf Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1600 ("Kramer's 
historical examples and list of political checks ... include no mention of direct popular action."). 
12. I am not a close student of these mobilizations, but I do recall reading Leonard Richards's 
study of Jacksonian "riots" and being impressed by the degree of organization underlying them. See 
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, "GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING": ANTI-ABOLITION MOBS IN 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1970); see also RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN 
MASSACHUSETTS: THE BOSTON COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE TOWNS, 1772-1774, at 
38-91 (Norton Library 1976) (1970) (describing the extensive, quasi-governmental role of the Commit-
tees of Correspondence prior to the American Revolution). I think it worth noting that Alexander and 
Solum seem to me almost obsessively concerned with the image of unruly mobs, which probably is 
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though, as Kramer repeatedly emphasizes, popular mobilization takes place 
through the ordinary forms of political organization, and especially through 
political parties and their leaders.13 
This fact, however, introduces yet another complication: We have to 
worry about simulacra of popular mobilization, that is, about assertions by 
political leaders that they are acting in the service of the people themselves 
when in fact the political leaders are pursuing their own agendas. Examin-
ing particular incidents in detail seems to be the only effective analytic 
strategy, but-simply to suggest what we might want to look at-consider 
the advocacy by political leaders of constitutional amendments to authorize 
organized prayer in public schools or to immunize from constitutional at-
tack legislation banning flag-burning as a means of political protest. In both 
cases the leaders claim, with some support from polling data, that a large 
portion of the public would like such amendments to the Constitution, and 
yet the consistent rejection of such amendments, and the fact that no one 
seems to suffer political damage from opposing the amendments, suggests 
that there is no underlying popular mobilization in those cases. I doubt that 
we are ever going to substitute crisp analytic categories, or "markers," as 
Scot Powe asks for,14 for historical judgment on this and related ques-
tions. 15 
As I have said, scholars are familiar with how political law-that is, 
constitutional law-is law. Kramer's primary goal is to delineate the politi-
linked, as well, to their reference to interpretive anarchy. For references to mobs, see Alexander & 
Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3 at 1622 (providing five reasons why "mobs ... cannot 
do the job required by robust popular constitutionalism"), 1636 (while acknowledging that Whig mobs 
were "polite," nonetheless asserting that "mob rule has a tragic history"). See also Powe, MiSSing in 
Action, supra note 10, at 893 (referring to "mass meetings" as the institutionalization of popular mobili-
zations). 
\3. Alexander & Solum overlook this feature of Kramer's account. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, 
Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1635 (asserting that popular action wherein "the people 
would act through government institutions ... would erase the distinction between popular constitu-
tionalism and executive or legislative supremacy"); see also id. at 1621 ("[A]n authoritative interpreta-
tion that binds government officials ... requires an institutional mechanism by which the multiple 
voices of popular opinion can be translated into a single voice of interpretive authority."). On Kramer's 
account, specific controversies are resolved by a complex process of institutional interaction, sufficient 
to satisfy the conceptual requirement Alexander and Solum impose. The difference between them and 
Kramer, it seems to me, is that they fail to explain why their conceptual requirement is for a single 
institutional mechanism operating identically across all historical periods. 
14. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 892 (after enumerating some public officials who 
may have been speaking for popular mobilizations, commenting, "Perhaps they all were; perhaps none 
of them were. But it would be nice to have a marker to know."). 
15. Powe discusses efforts to restore organized prayer to the public schools, but provides almost 
no evidence that this was a popular rather than a politicians' movement. The one datum he does pro-
vide--that according to a work published in 1971, "[t]wo-thirds of all Southern schools continued 
exactly as before," id. at 876--is outdated and, in the absence of some indication of what percentage of 
students in Southern schools attended those schools, does not shed much light on the question of popu-
lar support for pro-prayer initiatives. Id. at 875-77. 
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cal component of political law. It is important to his effort that we avoid 
treating politics as mere preference. To use Bruce Ackerman's terminol-
ogy, normal politics involves arguments about which of our preferences 
ought to be converted into public policy.16 The politics in political law is 
different, and not, as in Ackerman's scheme, because of the greater norma-
tive weight that attaches to what the people are concerned with during con-
stitutional moments. 17 It is different because it typically has a different 
rhetoric from normal politics, even though it takes the same form that nor-
mal politics does. 
When popular mobilizations are mediated by political institutions, as 
they usually are, that form of mobilization is one of interaction among leg-
islatures, the President and other executive officials, and the courts, over 
matters they all treat as being of constitutional significance. What matters 
to Kramer is that in these interactions, unlike those of normal politics, the 
legislative and executive participants clearly assert their equality with the 
courts on questions of constitutional interpretation. Interactions among the 
branches occur in normal politics, but Congress and the President accept 
that the courts have the last word in interpreting the law, that is, in the ret-
rospective enterprise. 18 What makes constitutional law as political law 
different is that the legislative and executive participants explicitly insist 
that the courts' view of what the existing Constitution means has no special 
weight as law, but only the value that attaches to that view as a rational 
matter. Here the legislative and executive participants take the position that 
they too are entitled to engage in the retrospective enterprise of interpreting 
the Constitution, often because of the way in which the Constitution ex-
presses who we are as a nation. 
The fact that constitutional law as political law can be performed 
through interactions among the branches of government contributes to the 
inherent fuzziness of the category popular constitutionalism. Those interac-
tions are structured to some extent. For example, the "case or controversy" 
requirement of Article III means that courts are rarely-though not never-
16. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDA nONS 230-65(1991). 
17. For one thing, in Kramer's view (and mine), popular mobilizations are a more pervasive 
phenomenon than Ackerman's metaphor of constitutional moments suggests (although in practice 
Ackerman may be so profligate in identifying constitutional moments and near-moments that the differ-
ence between his view and mine may be quite small). 
18. Of course, normal politics usually involves the adoption and interpretation of statutes, and 
Congress and the President can revise a statute prospectively if they disagree with how the courts have 
interpreted it. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 u.s. 429 (1992) (holding that Con-
gress can modify the substantive provisions of a statute to thwart an anticipated judicial interpretation, 
without violating the proscriptions of Article III). Compare Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211 (1995) (holding that Article III precludes Congress from retrospectively reviving causes of action 
previously barred by the expiration of the then-applicable statute oflimitations). 
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the first movers in the interactions. However, in general, the interactions 
are fluid, and take different forms at different times. 19 That means that we 
are not going to be able to make strong claims about the inherent structure 
of constitutional law as political law, or even to be confident that we have 
identified episodes of constitutional law as political law rather than normal 
politics.2o Ordinarily, I believe, all that we will be able to say is that at a 
given time constitutional law as political law was performed by a given 
kind of interaction between legislatures, Presidents, and courts, and at an-
other time it was performed by another kind of interaction.21 There can be 
no claim that how it was performed at any particular time captures the es-
sence of popular constitutionalism. In other words, the analysis of popular 
constitutionalism is necessarily historical rather than conceptual.22 
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A FORM OF DIALOGIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Dialogic accounts of constitutional law treat the people, legislatures, 
executives, and courts as in conversation. We can distinguish among dia-
logic accounts primarily by considering the time frame over which the 
conversation occurs, and secondarily (but importantly for purposes of un-
derstanding popular constitutionalism) by considering who signals that the 
conversation is over. 
19. And, of course, Kramer's primary lament about the current period is that the people, and their 
political leaders, appear to have abandoned the commitment he finds in U.S. history to constitutional 
law as political law. 
20. The strength and weakness of Ackerman's enterprise, I believe, lies in his effort to identify 
formal criteria that do identify constitutional moments. For my comments on that effort, see MARK 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 4 (2003). 
21. Kramer emphasizes this point in headings such as "Popular Constitutionalism, circa 1840." 
KRAMER, supra note I, at 196. In one sense, it is fair to say that Kramer does not describe "how [popu-
lar constitutionalism] is supposed to operate," Carpenter, supra note 6, at 432, but only because, on his 
account, it is not "supposed" to operate in any particular way. Popular constitutionalism simply is the 
interaction among the people, political leaders, and political institutions (including the courts) over 
questions of constitutional meaning. I confess to having been unsuccessful in my efforts to persuade 
constitutional lawyers that the political question doctrine is a doctrine of constitutional law qua law in 
which the substance of constitutional law is simply the outcome of political contest. For one version of 
my argument, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation 
and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2002). 
22. I am puzzled by Alexander and Solum's assertion that normative claims cannot be founded on 
an examination of historical experience unless that experience is refined into analytically precise terms. 
See Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1617 (criticizing Kramer's "delib-
erate looseness" when coupled with his "normative agenda"). Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the 
People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 660 (2005) (book review), in referring to Kramer's "historical 
pragmatism," seems to me to have a better understanding of the relation between Kramer's historical 
inquiry and his normative proposals. 
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A standard political science model of the interaction between the Su-
preme Court and the political branches sees a dialogue occurring over a 
relatively long time frame. Originating with Robert Dahl in 1957,23 and 
updated by Barry Friedman and others,24 this model has the Court being 
brought into line with the constitutional views held by a political coalition 
that sustains itself in power for a suitably long period.25 The mechanism for 
alignment is the appointment process: As older judges die or retire, they are 
replaced by new ones who share the constitutional views of the dominant 
political coalition.26 Notably, in this model it is irrelevant whether the 
dominant coalition opposes judicial supremacy in constitutional interpreta-
tion or merely disagrees with the interpretations provided by a Court that it 
does not (yet) control. In the end, the dominant coalition comes to live with 
judicial supremacy because, once it has taken control of the Court, it then 
finds the issue of judicial supremacy irrelevant. 
Scholars who emphasize the role of social movements in shaping con-
stitutional law, such as Robert Post and Reva Siegel,27 offer a model in 
which the conversation can take place over a shorter term than in the politi-
cal scientists' model.28 According to this view, the people influence consti-
tutional law by organizing social movements that offer distinctive 
constitutional visions, typically oppositional to the vision dominant in the 
courts when the movements begin. Social movements influence constitu-
tional law in two ways. One returns us to the political scientists' model: 
The movements affect electoral politics, which in turn affects the composi-
tion of the courts. But, the social movement model offers an alternative 
23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 61. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
24. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993); Barry 
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 1257 (2004). 
25. For Powe's endorsement of this model, see Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 890 ("There is no time since the Civil War when a party won three consecutive presidential elections and 
failed to gain a majority on the Court. "). 
26. Cj Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1618 (referring to the use 
of "the political process to change [the Supreme Court's) composition if we feel it has gone too far 
astray"); Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 885 (describing "judges" as the "instrument" 
contemporary political parties hope to use to implement their constitutional visions). 
27. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note I, at 1029 n.13, provide this list of their 
work: Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticiassifica-
tion Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, 
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 
297 (2001). 
28. Although it is not inherent in their model that it does. 
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mechanism: Judges observing the social movement and its effects on soci-
ety change their views about what the Constitution means.29 Unlike the 
political scientists' model, then, the social movement model does not de-
pend on a change in the Court's composition for there to be a change in 
constitutional interpretation. Like that model, though, the social movement 
model understands the story to end when the courts come into line.30 
Bruce Ackerman has offered a model with an even shorter time frame. 
Important to his account of constitutional transformation is the "switch in 
time."31 Facing a mobilized public, and its political leadership, the courts 
abandon their previous interpretation of the Constitution and adopt the one 
offered by their conversational partners (here, more like adversaries). The 
interactions that produce the switch in time occur within a compressed time 
period, which is of course consistent with Ackerman's metaphor of "mo-
ments," that is, short periods of time in which important political and con-
stitutional developments take place. Unlike the social movements model, 
here the mechanism of change is not persuasion but submission or fear that 
failure to change will produce severe adverse consequences for the Court. 
But, like that model, the conversation ends when the Court comes to agree 
with its adversaries. For Ackerman, after the Court changes, a new period 
of normal politics takes hold until the next constitutional moment. 
Finally, we come to popular constitutionalism as a dialogic process. 
Here the conversation takes place in real time, much as in Ackerman's 
model. In popular constitutionalism, everyone-the mobilized people, their 
political representatives, and the courts-offers up constitutional interpreta-
tions all at once. The interactions among these political actors, that is, their 
conversation, produces constitutional law. What is distinctive about popu-
lar constitutionalism is that the courts have no normative priority in the 
conversation. For popular constitutionalists, it simply does not matter 
whether, or when, or how, the courts come to accept the constitutional in-
terpretation offered by the people themselves.32 Sometimes the conversa-
29. Cf Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1626 (noting that "the 
Supreme Court could pay attention to popular criticism of its decisions"). 
30. Cf Powe, MisSing in Action, supra note 10, at 866 ("Forcing the Court to change its mind, 
either by convincing the Justices they erred or, more likely, by new appointments, would seem to be the 
most likely mechanism through which the people could control constitutional law.") Note the identifica-
tion here of constitutional law with adjudicated law. 
31. See. e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 18-20 (1998) (provid-
ing a "five-stage process" including the switch in time); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 265 (2005) (describing "a recurring institutional dynamic," including a switch in time). 
32. Cf Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note I, at 1038 ("[T]he fundamental 
constitutional beliefs of the American people are informed and sustained by the constitutional law 
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tions will end with the legislature and executive, and the people, accepting 
the judges' decisions.33 But, sometimes the conversations will end with the 
legislature or the executive going their own way, ignoring the imprecations 
hurled at them by the courts and supporters of judicial supremacy.34 
This aspect of popular constitutionalism is likely to be unattractive to 
those who think that there is some necessary connection between analytic 
clarity and social stability.35 As I have emphasized, popular constitutional-
ism does not offer crisp analytic categories that tell us what will happen 
when the people, through their legislators, urge one constitutional interpre-
tation, the President urges another, and the courts yet a third. So, the seeker 
of analytic clarity will ask, Doesn't popular constitutionalism portend anar-
chy?36 I have argued elsewhere that it does not,37 because the "anarchy" 
argument mistakenly conflates a lack of analytic clarity with social disor-
announced by courts, just as that law is infonned and sustained by the fundamental constitutional 
beliefs of Americans."). 
33. For this reason, the "populist tu quoque" offered by Alexander and Solum-that the people of 
the United States at present have accepted judicial supremacy-is not inconsistent with popular consti-
tutionalism. See Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1638. Post and Siegel 
present a more defensible version of the point: 
Americans have generally been committed both to judicially enforceable constitutional rights 
and to the idea that the Constitution reflects the political self-conception of the nation. They 
have understood that judicially enforceable rights play an important role in guaranteeing the 
conditions of popular constitutionalism, and that popular constitutionalism plays an important 
role in articulating the fundamental values that judicially enforceable rights function to instan-
tiate. 
Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note I, at 1036-37. And, for my version, see Mark 
Tushnet, Forms 0/ Judicial Review as Expressions o/Constitutional Patriotism, 22 L. & PHIL. 353, 375 (2003) ("[T]he people of the United States seem both (a) committed to strong-fonnjudicial review, and 
(b) sufficiently self-governing to count as participants in a process of constitutional democracy."). 
Kramer's discussion of "Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004," in KRAMER, supra note I, at 227-48, 
should be read as arguing that the commitment to judicial supremacy or strong-fonn judicial review is 
historically contingent and perhaps historically anomalous. See also Hulsebosch, supra note 22 passim, 
one of whose general themes is that Kramer underestimates the degree to which the American people 
have historically been ambivalent about judicial supremacy, simultaneously committed to it and nerv-
ous about that commitment. 
34. A popular constitutionalist might predict, and take some satisfaction in the fact, that the courts 
will eventually come into line, for any of the reasons set out in the other models. But, that prediction is 
not intrinsic to popular constitutionalism, which can tolerate long periods of judicial resistance to the 
views offered by the mobilized people and their political leaders. 
35. And, of course, to those-whose views I address in the next Section of this Article-who 
think that the courts almost always offer better constitutional interpretations than the people themselves. 
36. See Alexander & Solum, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 1610-11 ("Without a 
mechanism to resolve the dispute, ... boundary conflicts would ... undennine the Constitution's 
ability to serve the rule-of-Iaw functions of enabling peaceful dispute resolution .... Even worse, such 
conflicts might degenerate into naked power struggles, raising the Hobbesian specter of social chaos."), 
1613 (arguing that one version of popular constitutionalism's "underlying logic ... leads to anarchy"). 
Cf Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. 
REv. 1359 passim (1997) (arguing that judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is necessary to 
avoid interpretive anarchy, which has undesirable social consequences in making people uncertain 
about the legal rules that will govern their daily activities). 
37. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 27-28 (1999). 
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der. Political institutions keep on operating without difficulty across a wide 
range of matters even as popular constitutionalism's conversations take 
place on some (of course important) issues. People in organized societies 
tolerate a fair amount of uncertainty on some questions as long as there is 
sufficient stability on other matters.38 Proponents of the "anarchy" argu-
ment would have to offer some evidence that anarchy actually occurs be-
fore their position would have some bite. Kramer's account of popular 
constitutionalism in U.S. history strongly suggests that popular constitu-
tionalism can exist with a fair amount of social stability.39 Further, as I 
have indicated, popular constitutionalism's conversations are not entirely 
unstructured. They use the ordinary modes of political action, with which 
people are familiar and which, therefore, do not leave people feeling as if 
they are at sea in their daily lives. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Does popular constitutionalism portend real social anarchy, as distin-
guishing from conceptual messiness? One reason to think that it does not is 
the history Kramer recounts-a history in which substantial segments of 
the American public have been committed to popular constitutionalism, 
and simultaneously one in which the nation's social disorders have hardly 
been attributable to that commitment. Still, one could fairly have conse-
quentialist concerns about popular constitutionalism: Even if the people 
themselves did not regularly riot in the streets, might not their constitu-
tional interpretations be systematically worse than those proffered by the 
courts? 
Answering that question obviously requires some systematic compara-
tive analysis. Conducting such an analysis is difficult. Typically, what we 
get are anecdotes about occasions-sometimes, more than a few occa-
sions-on which one institution performed badly according to the author's 
often unstated criteria of good performance.4o With luck the author will 
explain why some other institution performed well (again according to 
38. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 107, quotes Thomas Jefferson's version of this point: "[w)e 
have ... in more than one instance, seen the opinions of different departments in opposition to each 
other, & no ill ensue." 
39. For a historical study of a situation in which interpretive anarchy actually prevailed for a 
while, see Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Convulses a Nation ": The Early Republic's Great-
est Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004) (reviewing brief period in 
Kentucky history during which the legislature was given unabashed supremacy with no meaningful 
judicial review). I read Ruger as showing that interpretive anarchy did not produce any more day-to-day 
social instability than was otherwise characteristic of the locality in which it occurred. 
40. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 866-84 (describing several episodes of arguable 
popular constitutionalism), is exemplary. 
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those criteria), or would have performed well had it been given the chance, 
in the same circumstances. But, anecdotes, even several anecdotes, are not 
enough. What we need is some systematic analysis of comparative institu-
tionaloperation. 
Here are some components of such an analysis.41 First, we would have 
to specify some time frame over which the analysis should occur. Institu-
tions always operate imperfectly, and the time line for imperfect operation 
will differ across institutions even if the institutions are equally good (or 
bad) overall. That means that it will usually be possible for an author to 
find some time period in which her favored institution operated well ac-
cording to her criteria and the alternative institution operated badly. Exam-
ining only that time period might be quite misleading. Consider, for 
example, a ten-year period in which the Supreme Court does quite a good 
job of advancing constitutional interests and Congress does a bad job. 
Maybe we simply have identified an aberrational period. If we expanded 
our analysis to consider the decades before and after that period, we might 
find that Congress and the Court performed about equally well, or even that 
Congress outperformed the Court. 
Those interested in addressing proposals for constitutional reform 
should aim for a forward-looking analysis. Such individuals would typi-
cally like to know how different institutions are likely to perform within 
some time horizon they think appropriate (their life span, that of their chil-
dren, and so forth). But, of course, the only basis they have for evaluating 
likely future performance is past performance. Ad hoc choices of past time 
periods are likely to be misleading, and we must also be alert to the possi-
bility that institutions operate differently now from the way they did in the 
past.42 
Second, we have to take account of all types of good and bad per-
formance. A court can perform badly by invalidating a statute that it 
"should have" upheld, or by failing to invalidate one that it should have 
struck down. Popular mobilizations can perform badly by inducing political 
leaders to introduce and enact bad statutes, or by failing to mobilize effec-
41. My approach is derived from that offered by Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the 
Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002). 
42. Cf Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 894-95 ("The fact that Americans used certain 
institutions and procedures before the Civil War is hardly an argument for using them today. Neither the 
times nor the Constitution is static."). For example, one might think that improvements in the technol-
ogy of partisan gerrymandering and innovations in enforcing party discipline within the past decade 
make it inappropriate to project into the future an evaluation of congressional performance based on its 
behavior in the 1960s and 1970s. For a recent argument that such changes have indeed occurred, see 
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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tively enough to induce those leaders to enact good statutes. I have argued 
that evaluation of legislative capacity to interpret the Constitution should 
focus on completed legislative actions and those examples, rare in U.S. 
constitutional practice,43 of constitutional provisioHs that impose affirma-
tive duties on legislatures.44 That assessment is unavailable with respect to 
popular constitutionalism more broadly understood, because there is no 
obvious way of knowing when a popular mobilization is "completed."45 
Once again, judgment, rather than a measuring rod, is what we will need. 
Third, we would have to specify what counts as advancing a constitu-
tional value.46 One manifestation of not specifying this is quite common 
and often unnoticed. The failing takes the form of assuming that only those 
values the Supreme Court takes seriously count as admissible in discussing 
what the Constitution, properly interpreted, means. So, for example, the 
author will compare what state legislatures did with respect to racial equal-
ity to what the Supreme Court did during some period, and what Congress 
did with respect to free expression to what the Supreme Court did, and 
more. This approach fails t.o take into account the possibility that there 
might be interpretations of constitutional provisions that the Supreme Court 
does not admit into discussion.47 One might, for example, believe that the 
U.S. Constitution commits the nation to guaranteeing income security for 
all even though that position has little purchase in contemporary adjudi-
43. Other constitutions do impose some duties on legislatures. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE PORTUGUESE REpUBLIC art. 283 ("Unconstitutionality by Omission"), available at 
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/PortaIIENlPortugallSistema]0Iitico/Constituicao/constituicao_p37.htm. 
44. Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and 
Two Informal Case Studies, 50 DUKE L. J. 1395 (2001). 
45. That is, of course, unless one rejects the premises of popular constitutionalism and takes 
judicial agreement with the people's constitutional interpretation as the index of a mobilization's com-
pletion. 
46. For example, Powe's consequentialist conclusions rest on the values held by standard contem-
porary liberals in the United States. This comes through particularly clearly in his assumption that 
popular mobilizations on issues of law and order and against the right to choose with respect to abortion 
obviously count against the claims of popular constitutionalism. For his discussion of these mobiliza-
tions, see Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 874---75 (law and order), 881-83 (anti-abortion 
rights). One might say that Powe "sees popular constitutionalism only when he (dis]approves of the 
cause," id. at 887 (prefix in brackets added to quoted text; Powe was describing Larry Kramer). 
47. This point differs from the related one, made familiar by Lawrence Sager, that some constitu-
tional provisions are underenforced, in the sense that primary responsibility for advancing those values 
lies outside the courts. For Sager's most recent explication, see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN 
PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 93-128 (2004). One important 
feature of underenforced provisions, at least as I understand Sager's approach, is that the courts and 
other institutions acknowledge that a constitutional value is at stake, but the courts refrain from fully 
enforcing that value because of their institutional incapacities. Note that institutions other than the 
courts will necessarily come out "better" in enforcing constitutional provisions when we consider 
underenforced ones. My concern in the text above is with situations in which the courts do not ac-
knowledge that a constitutional value is implicated. 
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cated constitutional law.48 One holding that view might rank the Supreme 
Court's constitutional performance well below that of Congress. 
At this point, my earlier observation that popular constitutionalism is, 
as law, in part a retrospective effort to identify who we are as a nation be-
comes particularly important. Without here (or, I fear, elsewhere) providing 
the kind of historical support that would be needed, I think it plausible to 
contend that the people of the United States have taken on several deep 
constitutional commitments, the most obvious of which are to income secu-
rity and environmental protection. On this view, enacting the Social Secu-
rity system and the Endangered Species Act were decisions about what the 
Constitution, properly interpreted, requires. And yet, the courts have never 
said that such statutes have constitutional dimensions. Taking the courts' 
assertions about what our constitutional rights are as providing the criteria 
for comparing how institutions perform will omit, by fiat alone, a compari-
son on the issues of income security and environmental protection. 
Fourth, we have to compare institutional performance across the entire 
range of (what we regard as) constitutional provisions. For example, we 
might find that, in some time period, courts performed reasonably well on 
issues of free expression while legislatures performed badly, and that, in 
the same period, legislatures did a very good job of promoting income se-
curity. We would then have to identify some ranking and weighting scheme 
so that we could determine which institution operated better overall. To use 
a single-institution example, suppose the Supreme Court got a minor First 
Amendment question "right" while failing to invalidate a massive denial of 
racial equality. We could say that the Court operated badly, or well, only if 
we had some measure of relative importance. Now add the necessary com-
parative institutional focus, and the analysis becomes even more com-
plex.49 Suppose Congress enacts a relatively minor statute that violates 
principles of free expression (as we understand them),50 and at the same 
time enacts a large-scale program enhancing income security. The First 
Amendment violation has to reduce the "goodness" we attribute to Con-
48. This is not a frivolous proposition. For the view from a generation or so ago, see Frank I. 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969). 
49. Many of the examples in Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, are non-comparative: one 
could couple massive resistance with the Supreme Court's abdication of the job of enforcing its deseg-
regation decisions until after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, for example. Notably, popular mobilizations during the period included the civil rights move-
ment, which Powe mentions, id. at 893, but does not seem to count in his consequentialist evaluation of 
popular constitutionalism, and resulted in legislative action that preceded serious judicial efforts to 
desegregate Southern schools. 
50. My current example is the federal mushroom advertising program held unconstitutional in 
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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gress because of the income-security legislation. Now we have to compare 
the imperfect operation of the courts with the imperfect operation of Con-
gress.51 
Finally, it bears emphasizing that we have to develop arguments for 
what goes on the list as a constitutional provision, for the rankings we give 
the items on the list, and for the weights we assign to particular actions and 
inactions. These are going to be arguments in substantive political theory.52 
It is quite unlikely that we will find substantial agreement among scholars 
about the list, ranking, and weights, given the existence of real disagree-
ments about substantive political theory.53 
Needless to say, no one really tries to do a serious comparison of insti-
tutions as they actually operate. I have already pointed out that popular 
constitutionalism includes a range of institutional interactions. Focusing 
solely on "mobs," and within the category of mobs, only on those that can 
fairly be characterized as threatening anarchy, is at best the first step in an 
analysis of popular constitutionalism's consequences, as compared to the 
consequences of judicial supremacy. That example suggests to me that 
what we see in purported comparative evaluations of popular constitutional 
and judicial supremacy are disagreements about substantive political 
theory. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of something that is simultaneously law and political is obvi-
ously unfamiliar to U.S. constitutional theorists today, as the pervasive 
expressions of puzzlement about Kramer's meaning demonstrate. It was 
not unfamiliar in earlier times, as Kramer shows in some detail. He also 
sketches an account of how it became unfamiliar, but providing the details 
of that account was not part of the charge he took upon himself. We do 
know how he would tell the story. He would not give us an analysis of con-
cepts associated with judicial review, or of the coherence of a "footnote 
four" jurisprudence. He would--or at least I would-tell a story about pol i-
51. Powe, Missing in Action, supra note 10, at 893 ("[T]he Supreme Court has been reasonably 
good on the upside and nowhere near as bad [as 'mass movements of the twentieth century that have set 
themselves out to overturn an existing legal order'] on the downside."), has the correct form an evalua-
tion should take. Unfortunately, the analysis is not supported in an othelWise quite heavily footnoted 
essay, except by references to fascism and communism that seem to me inapposite to an analysis predi-
cated on U.S. constitutional experience (and, with respect to Russian communism, inapposite as an 
example of a popular movement). 
52. And not, I emphasize, an exercise in the analytic philosophy oflaw. 
53. For example, my claim that we interpret the Constitution by the retrospective construction of 
an understanding of our national identify is clearly a contestable position in political theory. 
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tics operating in real historical time. Its main line would, I think, be about 
how Democrats first and then Republicans found political advantage in 
supporting judicial supremacy, and how those commitments persisted even 
as, or perhaps because, the outcomes the Supreme Court was producing 
were inconsistent with the substantive policies Democrats (mostly) and 
Republicans (to some extent) sought to advance.54 In short, it would be an 
argument about constitutional theory made by means of a historical analy-
sis of constitutional politics-as is The People Themselves. 
54. This is not the forum for me to offer the story J would teB, but hints can be found throughout 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 20. 
